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Abstract 
Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to infer mental states. The purpose of Study 1 was to 
reduce performance demands on a ToM test for forty (22 females) children (M age = 4.604; 
SD age = 1.128). Here, a low-uncertainty condition included a behaviour repetition 
manipulation, intended to increase success rate—but results did not confirm our hypothesis. 
Potential reasons for the results of Study 1 are discussed and tested in Study 2. The purpose 
of Study 2 was to determine the mechanism by which ToM operates in fifty-seven (26 
females) adult participants (M age = 20.632; SD age = 3.368) by altering informational richness 
more directly. Results of Study 2 confirm that the mechanism by which ToM operates is via 
uncertainty reduction. These data motivate Study 3 in which child-appropriate vignettes will 
be used to address the limitations of Study 1 and implement the design of Study 2.  
Keywords 
Theory of Mind Development, Fundamental Conceptual Change View, Substantial 
Continuity View, Information-Theory, Uncertainty-Reduction. 
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Chapter 1 : General Introduction and Motivation Behind Study 1 
In 1978, David Premack and Guy Woodruff conducted one of the most highly cited and 
controversial studies of animal cognition. Specifically, they were interested in learning whether 
or not a chimpanzee has the capacity to reason about the unobservable mental states of others. 
This ability has been formally termed as a Theory of Mind (ToM)—or, more informally, as 
mind-reading—and it involves the ability to make inferences about other individuals’ mental 
states including their perceptions, emotions, desires, beliefs, and intentions. Such inferences are 
deemed a theory because they are not directly observable and thus, are inevitably made with 
some level of uncertainty (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Since its introduction in 1978, a 
plethora of similar studies on ToM have followed. But as is made evident in the title of this 
paper, this is not an essay in animal ToM but one examining human mental state reasoning.  
An adequately functioning ToM is integral to facilitating our basic daily social and 
communicative interactions, thus many researchers have sought to delineate when in ontogenetic 
human development we acquire a ToM (Rosnay, Fink, Begeer, Slaughter & Peterson, 2013; 
Slaughter, 2015). Therefore, the introductory section of the present paper will adhere by the 
following sequential order: First, series of experiments examining young, preschool-aged 
children’s mental state reasoning capacities will be reviewed—followed by a more recent body 
of infant literature studying ToM in a considerably younger population; next, these two bodies of 
literature will be conceptualized together into one, coherent framework by addressing past 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
accounts on this issue by scholars in the field. And finally, a novel theoretical account will be 
highlighted with the aim of motivating the present experiment. 
1 « When Do We Develop a ToM? » 
 « A Look at the Preschooler’s Mind-Reading Capacity » 
In order to discern when young children develop a ToM—first, researchers must develop 
a means to test ToM in said populations. To this end, several tests of mental state reasoning have 
emerged. In a recent review, Virginia Slaughter (2015) provided an overview of various tests of 
children’s’ mind-reading capacity along with the conceptual understanding underlying each test 
type. Because ToM is a broad, umbrella-term under which various mentalizing capacities fall—
this review also demonstrates that as ToM tests increase in their difficulty, the proportion of 
preschool-aged children who pass sharply declines. At its simplest level, tests known as diverse 
desires tests assess children’s conceptual understanding that not everyone likes and wants—
desires—the same thing. Not surprisingly, the majority of 3-7 year-old children pass these types 
of tests.  
Tests assessing children’s understanding of not the desires of others—but the beliefs of 
others—are considerably more difficult. For example, tests known as false-belief reasoning tests 
evaluate children’s ability to recognize that people can sometimes be wrong in their beliefs about 
something, ergo they can possess what is known as a false-belief. People’s behavior when faced 
with a false-belief, while seemingly strange, is actually in line with their beliefs. Let’s consider a 
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real-world example of a false-belief scenario. If Professor Smith were to place her keys into her 
leather purse but unbeknownst to her—her 3-year-old son removes her keys and places them in 
the trash can at home—Professor Smith will likely search frantically in her purse for her keys. 
Although her behavior is not consistent with the true state of affairs—it is consistent with her 
belief, her mistaken, false, belief. Intriguingly, while some preschool-aged children are able to 
pass tests of false-belief reasoning ability, others struggle with such tests (Slaughter, 2015).  
One of the most commonly used types of false-belief reasoning tests is known as the 
Sally-Anne Test (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). In this test, children are first presented 
with a series of characters and objects; namely, a character named Sally, a character named 
Anne, a marble (or ball), a box, and a basket. After their initial introduction, children are shown a 
sequence of events in the form of a puppet show. First, Sally places the marble into the basket. 
Then, Sally leaves the room and during her absence, Anne moves the marble from the basket to 
the box—after which Anne leaves. And finally, Sally returns and children are asked the 
following critical question: “Where will Sally look for the marble?” in an effort to engage their 
ability to make an accurate prediction about Sally’s behavior.  
Of course, we can clearly see that children are presented with a dichotomous choice—
they can select the basket as the appropriate answer, or they can select the box. If children select 
the basket as the location in which Sally will look for the marble, then they pass and are said to 
have a ToM—or more precisely, the ability to reason about another individual’s false-beliefs. If, 
on the other hand, children select the box as the location in which Sally will look for the marble, 
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then they fail and are said to lack this ability. With this test, Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) found that 
four-year-old healthy, neurotypical children were able to pass this test, setting the foundation for 
a series of experiments corroborating the view that ToM ability undergoes a genuine and 
fundamental shift in early childhood.  
1.2 « Fundamental Conceptual Change View » 
Subsequent experiments on children’s false-belief reasoning used this test—the Sally-
Anne test—or some similar variant of it, thus rendering it one of the most widely used tests of 
ToM (Slaughter, 2015). These types of ToM tests, of course, are not without flaws and indeed, 
have been subject to a significant and justified amount of scrutiny (Bloom & German, 2000). 
One such criticism is the mere fact that reasoning about mental states encompasses so much 
more than simply predicting people’s behavior on the basis of their mistaken beliefs. Despite the 
logical validity of arguments such as this, the Sally-Anne test is still a widely used test of ToM 
(Bishop-Fitzpatrick, Mazefsky, Eack & Minshew, 2017; Lábadi & Beke, 2017; O’Toole, Monks 
& Tsermentseli, 2017). 
But two years prior to the development of the Sally-Anne test, a similar type of false-
belief test was used by Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner in 1983. Much like the Sally-Anne test, 
a character named Maxi (analogous to Sally) places chocolate (analogous to the marble) into 
cupboard x (analogous to the basket). In his absence, his mother (analogous to Anne) places the 
chocolate into cupboard y (analogous to the box). Children then must indicate where Maxi will 
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look for the chocolate. The results of this study demonstrated an interesting developmental shift 
whereby none of the 3-4 year-old children passed, 57% of 4-6 year-old children passed, and 86% 
of 6-9 year-old children passed. Based on these results, it was concluded that the ability to 
represent mental states emerges during the late preschool years (approximately 4-6 years-of-age; 
Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  
Some years later, further evidence in support of the view that younger preschoolers lack a 
ToM (i.e. have a conceptual deficit in ToM) came with a slightly different type of false-belief 
reasoning test (Perner, Leekam & Wimmer, 1987). The false-belief tests discussed thus far are 
tests examining children’s ability to represent a character’s false belief about the location of an 
object. Therefore, they are typically referred to as location false-belief tests. But we can have an 
incorrect belief about other situations such as the contents of a container. This is precisely what 
Perner et al. (1987) tested. In addition to a location false-belief test, this study included a 
contents false-belief test in which children were brought into the laboratory with a friend. While 
the friend waited outside the room, an experimenter showed the child a box with the “Smarties” 
chocolate logo. When asked what they think is in the box, most children answered correctly, 
exclaiming “chocolate!” or “Smarties!” but to their surprise—the experimenter showed them that 
there was a pencil inside it. The test question was seemingly simple: “What will [name of friend] 
think is in here?” Again, the response options here are binary such that children can state one of 
two possible answer choices: Smarties chocolate, or a pencil. Consistent with the conceptual 
deficit view of ToM development, Perner et al. (1987) found that the majority of younger 
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preschoolers (3 year-olds) failed both location and contents false belief tasks. For both task 
types, younger children claimed that the agent will think that the location or contents of an object 
are consistent with reality. For what is now termed The Smarties Task, younger children 
consistently reported that their friend will think that there is a pencil in the box, despite the fact 
that she was outside of the room when the pencil was revealed to the child. The authors of this 
paper interpret these findings as indicating that “it is only when children are older than 3 years 
that they can assign conflicting truth values” (Perner et al., 1987, p. 136). 
These initial studies sparked the inception of a myriad of similar studies in the 1990’s. In 
fact, the field of ToM development flourished so much that in 2001, Henry Wellman, David 
Cross, and Julanne Watson conducted a meta-analytic review of 178 separate studies. Their 
findings serve as one of the most robust and cogent arguments in support of the conceptual 
deficit view. Irrespective of the differences in task types used across various studies—Wellman 
et al. (2001) found the same typical pattern across development. Specifically, younger children 
performed at below-chance, whereas their older preschool-aged counterparts performed well 
above-chance. There is thus a clear discontinuous change across development such that in a 
seemingly sudden acquisition of mental state reasoning—4-5 year-old children undergo a 
fundamental change in their capacity to represent others’ mental states. A second meta-analysis 
several years later confirmed these findings with analyses on studies of Chinese children (Liu, 
Wellman, Tardif & Sabbagh, 2008). This review included data from over 3,000 children and 
found that Chinese children also progress in a similar manner to Anglo-European children 
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studied in previous reports. Like the findings of the 2001 meta-analysis with Anglo-European 
children, younger Chinese preschoolers performed below chance on tests of false-belief 
reasoning. These parallel findings highlight the universal developmental trajectory of false-belief 
reasoning. Furthermore, they substantiate the view that an understanding of the beliefs of 
others—and arguably, an understanding of the minds of others—undergoes a genuine and 
fundamental conceptual change in the early preschool years (Liu et al., 2008). Based on the 
research presented thus far, it is apparent that a fully-functioning mind-reading system emerges 
when we are approximately 4-5 years-of-age. But is this the current consensus on ToM 
development amongst researchers of early social development today? In recent years, a cascade 
of new findings have emerged that bring into question the once widely held view that early in 
life, our social cognitive capacity was marked by a deficit in attributing mental states to others.  
2 « Mind-Reading Infants? » 
 In 2005, Kristine Onishi and Renée Baillargeon conducted one of the first and most 
groundbreaking studies of infant belief tracking. With a deceptively simple and unique 
paradigm—this study came to challenge and critique our previously held conceptions of ToM 
development. The researchers tested 15-month-old infants on their ability to track beliefs—and 
more specifically, false beliefs. If their results indicate that infants can, indeed, track the beliefs 
of others, then this would bring to question the genuine and discontinuous conceptual change 
view of ToM development. Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) presented infants with a series of 
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events much like those presented in the Sally-Anne test. Conceptually, the scenarios are very 
similar, as one character is presented, believing an object to be located in one location and during 
her/his absence—the object is moved to another location. Their paradigm involves an initial 
introduction during which infants are shown a woman facing a desk onto which a watermelon, a 
yellow box, and a green box are located. Then, the woman places the watermelon into the green 
box several times in what are termed familiarization trials. These trials make it clear to the infant 
that she believes the watermelon to be located in the green box. In false-belief trials, the woman 
leaves and during her absence, the watermelon magically moves from the green box to the 
yellow box. In a traditional false-belief task given to preschoolers, when the woman returns, 
children would be asked where she will look for the watermelon.  
However, because many 15-month-old infants are preverbal—Onishi and Baillargeon 
(2005) were required to obtain a non-verbal response. To this end, they included two versions in 
which they completed the story. In the first version, they had the woman search in the green box 
for the watermelon. This, of course, is an expected course of action because the green box is the 
location in which she believes the watermelon to be. But in the second version, they had the 
woman search in the yellow box for the watermelon. While it is true that this is the true location 
of the watermelon—critically, it is not where the woman believes the watermelon to be. 
Therefore, this is an unexpected course of action because, as an adult seeing such an event, we 
might wonder: “Why is she looking in the yellow box? How does she know that the watermelon 
is in there?” This is precisely the logic of their study—a paradigm termed a Violation of 
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Expectation (VOE) Paradigm because in some conditions, the infant’s expectations are violated. 
It should then logically follow that infants who view a VOE condition should be surprised and 
thus, look longer during these conditions (relative to conditions during which their expectations 
are not violated).  
This pattern of findings is precisely what Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) found. 
Remarkably, infants looked longer when the woman searched in the yellow box (the location in 
which she does not believe the watermelon to be) than when she searched in the green box (an 
action consistent with her beliefs) for the watermelon. These findings suggest that infants expect 
people to behave in ways that are consistent with their beliefs—including their false-beliefs. 
More broadly, these results indicate that rather than a fundamental and discontinuous shift from 
lacking a ToM to suddenly possessing a ToM by our fourth birthday—ToM is present early in 
life and exhibits a continual developmental trajectory from infancy to early childhood. 
2.1  « Substantial Continuity View » 
In a follow-up experiment using a similar VOE paradigm, a separate team of researchers 
tested 15-month-old infants on their ability to track the beliefs of others (Träble, Marinović & 
Pauen, 2010). Here, infants saw a similar series of events. First, a woman was situated in front of 
a ball and two containers. The woman believed the ball to be in one container but during her 
absence, it was moved to the other container. One critical difference between this paradigm and 
that of Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) was that rather than having the watermelon magically 
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move from one location to the other—both containers were balanced on a beam (much like a 
teeter totter seasaw in a children’s playground). Unbeknownst to the woman, the plank holding 
both containers shifted and thus, the ball rolled from the container that she believed it to be in to 
the other container. Like the findings of Onishi & Baillargeon (2005), Träble et al. (2010) found 
that infants looked reliably longer in VOE conditions than conditions in which the woman 
behaved in a way that was consistent with her beliefs. These results add to the flourishing 
literature in support of the view that false-belief understanding is present early in life and 
continually develops across ontogeny. 
In a series of experiments adding further support for this substantial continuity view and 
against the fundamental conceptual change view, yet another group of researchers tested the 
infant’s ability to track mental states (Surian, Caldi & Sperber, 2007). This study also 
implemented a VOE paradigm but here, rather than facing the agent as was done in previous 
studies (i.e. the infant faced the woman), infants shared the field of view of the agent. Once 
again, results suggested that infants expect that the agent’s search behavior to be consistent with 
his/her beliefs (Surian et al., 2007).  
At this juncture, one may reasonably argue that regardless of the internal validity of such 
experimental designs, in the real-world, when we encounter a situation in which we expect an 
object to be located in a given container and we find that it is missing, we should show some type 
of emotional reaction. In other words, we would naturally be surprised upon finding that we are 
mistaken about the location of an object—much like Professor Smith in the example presented at 
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the beginning of this chapter would be surprised to learn that her keys are missing from her 
purse. Thus in a recent series of experiments, Rose Scott (2017) included the emotional 
consequences of possessing a false-belief in a VOE paradigm with infants. Consistent with what 
you or I would presume, infants expected the agent to display the emotional expression of 
surprise upon encountering a false-belief. These results further substantiate the view that infants 
possess a rudimentary but robust capacity to reason about the mental states of others. 
But in addition to VOE paradigms, a different type of looking paradigm is often used 
with infants. Namely, the predictive or anticipatory looking paradigm during which the infant’s 
spontaneous looking behavior is measured prior to the end of the typical locations false-belief 
scenario. In a study using an anticipatory looking paradigm, Southgate, Senju & Csibra (2007) 
tested infant’s false-belief tracking capacity. After presenting infants with an agent who holds a 
false belief about the location of an object, the researchers measured infants’ spontaneous 
looking using an eye tracker. They found that infants reliably looked at the location in which the 
agent believes the object to be located—rather than where it is actually located. This pattern of 
behavior suggests that infants anticipate the subsequent behavior of an agent who holds a false 
belief (Southgate et al., 2007). Similar findings have even been observed in an anticipatory 
looking paradigm in which rather than including an agent with beliefs—the researchers had 
simple geometric shapes who “had beliefs” (Surian & Geraci, 2012). Astonishingly, 17-month-
old infants’ predictive looking reveals that they even spontaneously attribute beliefs to inanimate 
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objects, anticipating that the triangle will search for the disk in the location that s/he believes it 
to be.  
The evidence so far—while compelling and robust—is based on the inferences and 
attributions that we adults make from observations of infants’ looking behavior. Although the 
researchers may have postulated a-priori hypotheses regarding infants’ looking behaviour—
inferences of higher order cognition drawn from mere looking time data must be made with great 
caution. This, of course, is not a criticism specific to the infant literature on ToM development 
but may generalize to studies of infant cognition across various subjects and domains. In a recent 
study that, at least partly, addresses this criticism, infants were video-recorded as they watched a 
VOE false-belief paradigm (Moll, Khalulyan & Moffett, 2016). Interestingly, when infants 
viewed the actor behave in a way that is inconsistent with her beliefs (ergo a violation of the 
infant’s expectation), they were judged by independent raters to themselves display more facial 
tension. Now, the researchers are not simply coding looking times as indicative of a deeper 
cognitive function—but are assessing the infant’s emotional and facial display of suspense in 
response to the stimuli presented. Taken together, the data presented thus far make a cogent and 
compelling case for the existence of early false-belief reasoning in infants. 
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3 « How Does ToM Develop? Reconceptualising the Puzzling 
and Controversial Findings of Previous Research » 
 But the data thus far also present somewhat of a puzzle: If infants possess the ability to 
track, expect, anticipate, and respond to the false-beliefs of others—then why do early data with 
preschoolers demonstrate a conceptual deficit in 3-year-olds? To this very day, intense 
controversy surrounds the issue of when we develop the capacity to reason about the mistaken 
beliefs of others. Indeed, many researchers are still puzzled by the contrast between the growing 
body of infant literature on belief tracking and the initial research findings that younger 
preschoolers consistently fail tests of false-belief reasoning (Scott & Baillargeon, 2017). But 
perhaps part of the problem is that we are not asking the appropriate questions that may generate 
a cohesive answer to the conundrum of human ToM development. Rather than asking the 
question of when we develop a ToM—we should be asking the question of how we develop a 
ToM. That is, what are the cognitive mechanisms that underlie our capacity to mind-read? A 
more fruitful set of questions can be generated by taking a closer look at children’s performance 
on tests of false-belief reasoning such as the Sally-Anne test. For preschool-aged children who 
successfully pass false-belief reasoning tests—why do they pass? Is it because of a genuine 
mentalizing capacity? Or, are children deploying some other, non-mentalistic strategy to 
successfully pass? More importantly, when children fail tests of false-belief reasoning, why do 
they fail? Is it because they sincerely lack the ability to attribute mental states? In other words, is 
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it because they lack ToM competence? Or, is it possible that children who fail false-belief 
reasoning tests are faced with a series of performance demands that impede and hinder their 
ability to demonstrate their mind-reading capabilities?  
3.1  « The Competence-Performance Distinction » 
This distinction has been formalized as the Competence-Performance Distinction (Bloom 
& German, 2000; Chomsky, 1965; Surian & Leslie, 1999; Wellman et al., 2001; Yazdi, German, 
Defeyter & Siegal, 2006). Put simply, this distinction asserts that when completing any given 
task, there are at least two factors that predict success: the first is competence in that given 
area—in this case, a ToM; and the second is a series of other, non-focal task demands that 
interfere with successful performance. In false-belief reasoning given to preschoolers (like the 
Sally-Anne test), one of the most well-established critiques of it as a measure of ToM is that 
passing such tests often requires so much more than a ToM. That is, a series of performance 
demands often interfere and prevent children from demonstrating their true mindreading 
capabilities (Bloom & German, 2000). For example, demands on children’s inhibitory control as 
well as verbal and linguistic demands inherent in the task may impede and hinder their ability to 
demonstrate their true ToM.  
15 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 « Inhibitory Control as a Performance Demand » 
Regarding inhibitory performance demands, there is a strong and robust correlation 
between children’s performance on tests of inhibitory control and on tests of ToM (Carlson, 
Moses & Breton, 2002; Carlson, Moses & Claxton, 2004). In addition to these correlational 
studies, direct manipulations of inhibition have underscored the importance of inhibitory control 
when completing false-belief reasoning tests (Leslie, German & Polizzi, 2005). Here, rather than 
designing the scenario in such a way that Sally wants to approach the ball—Alan Leslie and his 
colleagues created a scenario during which the agent wanted to avoid the object (i.e. it made the 
agent sick). This deceptively simple manipulation increases the inhibition demands on 
performance, as it is more cognitively demanding because of the added computation inherent in 
the task. With this avoidance-desire task, the majority of four-year-old children who were able to 
pass the standard approach-desire false-belief reasoning test failed (Leslie et al., 2005). But 
inhibition is only one such performance demand that hinders children’s ability to succeed on the 
false-belief test. Indeed, in the reviewed research that follows, it should become apparent that 
manipulations that alter subtle—yet important—verbal aspects of the task can drastically alter 
children’s performance. 
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3.3 « Verbal Fluency as a Performance Demand » 
In an interesting set of studies, a manipulation on the test question that children were 
asked yielded some fascinating results (Surian & Leslie, 1999). Recall that in the original Sally-
Anne test, children are asked “Where will Sally look for the ball?” after which their response 
determines whether or not they are said to pass the test. In one of the most widely cited 
manipulations of the test, children were asked “Where will Sally look for the ball first?” (Surian 
& Leslie, 1999). Now, an overwhelming majority of 3-year-old children (who were once 
believed to lack a ToM) passed when given the look first test question. These findings confirm 
that young preschoolers’ difficulties on tests of ToM are largely due to linguistic performance 
factors inherent in the tasks themselves.  
Despite the compelling evidence provided by Surian and Leslie in 1999—the 2001 meta-
analysis by Henry Wellman and his colleagues—concluded otherwise. Recall that the results of 
this meta-analysis suggested that a genuine conceptual deficit of ToM exists in the young 
preschooler. Wellman et al. (2001) addressed manipulations aimed at reducing performance 
demands in tests of false-belief reasoning by stating that they disproportionately help older 
preschoolers and thus cannot explain deficits in younger cohorts. These findings render it 
possible, then, that young preschoolers fail not because of performance demands, but because of 
a genuine conceptual deficit (Wellman et al., 2001). But a few years later, a more in-depth 
investigation of manipulations such as the look-first manipulation revealed that it is not 
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necessarily true that this manipulation selectively benefits older children and that younger 
children can improve with it (Yazdi et al., 2006). Taken together, the results of the Surian and 
Leslie (1999) and Yazdi et al. (2006) studies strongly suggest that performance demands in the 
design of the false-belief reasoning tests are possible culprits for the young preschooler’s 
inability to pass. In recent years, this perspective has received more scientific support and is now 
one of the dominant and prevailing views of ToM development.  
3.4 « Making the Explicit False-Belief Test Easier: A Look at 
More Recent Cutting-Edge Research Findings » 
Given that 3-year-olds are just beginning to learn language, some aspects of the test 
question may be confusing (Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 2013). For example, in the test question, 
“where will Sally look for the ball?”—the word will may be conflated with should, rendering the 
answer given to the question to be viewed as false. In reality, Sally should look in the location in 
which the ball really is, but she would look in the container in which she believes it to be. To 
help address the verbal ambiguity of the test question—the researchers of this study removed the 
test question altogether. Instead, after the series of events were presented, the experimenter 
simply handed the agent doll (i.e. Sally) to the child and asked her/him to complete the story. To 
reduce any confusion on the part of the child, they asked the following two questions, “what 
happens next?” and “what is she going to do now?” and found that 3-year-olds are now able to 
pass. Clearly, replacing the verbally demanding and cryptic canonical test question with more 
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suitable ones helps reduce performance demands for young preschoolers and enables them to 
demonstrate their true ToM (Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 2013).  
In a follow-up experiment published last year, Paula Rubio-Fernández and Bart Geurts 
(2016) found that the perceptual salience and representational strength of the marble in the Sally-
Anne test may place performance demands on young children. Therefore, they recommend not 
mentioning the marble at all and instead, urge researchers to encourage young children to focus 
on the agent (i.e. Sally). To this end, they asked preschoolers questions like “where will Sally go 
now?” and found that most 3-year-olds are now able to pass (Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 2016). 
Another recently published study also found support for the processing-demands view in which 
younger children’s failure on false-belief reasoning tests may be an artifact of performance-
related task demands (Setoh, Scott & Baillargeon, 2016). Here, the authors argue that one reason 
why infants can pass false-belief reasoning tests while their older 3-year-old counterparts fail is 
because of some key differences between the task types given to infants and preschoolers.  
Critically, infants are given non-traditional, implicit false-belief reasoning tests in which 
their implicit, non-verbal responses (i.e. looking behavior) are measured as a basis of their 
success rate. In contrast, preschoolers are given traditional, explicit false-belief reasoning tests in 
which they must produce a verbal response that itself may place cognitive demands on the child 
and hinder their performance (Setoh et al., 2016). To reduce such performance demands, the 
researchers of this paper provided young children with several opportunities to practice giving 
verbal responses to questions in a series of practice trials. Even with the cryptic behaviour-
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prediction question of “where will Sally look for the ball?”—Setoh et al. (2016) found that 
following the added response-generation practice trials, even 2 and a half year old toddlers were 
able to pass!  
3.5 « Putting it all Together » 
At this juncture, it should be evident that the seemingly contradictory results of the 
preschool and infant literature can be resolved by taking into account the competence-
performance distinction. In effect, these apparently puzzling bodies of evidence are simply 
reflective of the performance demands inherent in false-belief reasoning tests given to 
preschoolers. Taken together, these data overwhelmingly support the substantial continuity view 
and bring into question the fundamental conceptual change view.  
4 « A Novel Theoretical Perspective: Information Theory and 
the Current Study » 
But in addition to the substantial amount of evidence suggesting that other, non-focal 
skills (such as inhibition and verbal fluency) are necessary to pass, an account informed by 
information theory can further explain why younger children consistently struggle. From an 
information-theoretic perspective (Balsam & Gallistel, 2009), ToM processing generates a series 
of possible representations of another agent’s mental state, each with varying levels of certainty 
(Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004). By returning to the Sally-Anne test, we can clearly see that 
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children are faced with a dichotomous choice—the basket, or the box. For each response option, 
children possess a specific level of certainty. If their level of uncertainty regarding the agent’s 
belief that it is in, say, the basket is high, then they will not choose that response option. From 
this standpoint, young children who fail false-belief tests may simply require more information 
to reduce their uncertainty about the character’s mental state (i.e., Sally’s belief about the ball’s 
location). In the standard FB task, Sally’s hiding of the ball into a basket only occurs once after 
which a series of other events occur, so it is possible that the amount of information pertaining to 
Sally’s belief about the ball’s location is inadequate. Children are required to make a mental state 
inference on the basis of one and only one piece of information; namely, that Sally put the ball 
into the basket. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that for the young child—making an inference 
about Sally’s beliefs is difficult. In essence, the impoverished nature of the information provided 
to children may be a critical factor that places performance demands on children. Consequently, 
we must enrich the amount of information that children are given, therefore reducing their level 
of uncertainty regarding the agent’s belief in standard tests of false-belief reasoning. 
4.1 « Study 1: Reducing Children’s Uncertainty through 
Repetition » 
Based on these considerations, we conducted an experiment that systematically 
manipulated the child’s uncertainty regarding another’s beliefs. Others have manipulated the 
story’s ambiguity by increasing the child’s uncertainty regarding the agent’s behavior and have 
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found that such manipulations undermine children’s performance (Scott & Roby, 2015). But in 
the current study, we wanted to know whether or not reducing children’s uncertainty and as 
such, the performance demands in a false-belief reasoning test will allow preschoolers who 
typically fail standard false-belief tasks to pass. In addition to the standard false-belief task (S-
FB), we included a low-uncertainty false-belief task (LU-FB) during which Sally repeatedly hid 
the ball into one location, thereby increasing the child’s certainty regarding Sally’s belief of the 
location of the ball. With each added repetition during which Sally places the ball in a given 
location—the child should become more certain that this, indeed, is the location in which she 
believes the ball to be located.  
4.2 « How the Uncertainty Reduction Manipulation 
Operates Mechanistically » 
Representationally, the belief in the child’s mind is strengthened by the low-uncertainty 
manipulation via repetition. That is, the child first possesses no mind-reading hypotheses and 
with incoming information, the ToM computational system generates a set of possible mental 
states in an abstract hypothesis space. Much like Bayesian models of cognitive reasoning 
(Gopnik, Glymour, Sobel, Schulz, Kushnir, & Danks, 2004; Perfors, Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & 
Xu, 2011), incoming information alters the probability of each hypothesis being the correct one 
underlying the observation. This probability index is subjective and thus constitutes a certainty 
index that attaches to each belief representation and is updated based on the behavioural cues that 
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the child observes (i.e. the data input). The manipulation in the low-uncertainty condition 
encompasses a scenario during which the agent repeatedly engages in a behaviour in an effort to 
increase the certainty index attached to the correct belief hypothesis. Put more simply, the child 
first possesses no belief hypotheses pertaining to Sally’s belief about the location of the ball. 
After being presented with the standard false-belief scenario, the child’s ToM computational 
system consists of two possible hypotheses regarding Sally’s belief of the ball’s location: 1) 
Sally believes that the ball is in the basket; and 2) Sally believes that the ball is in the box. In the 
standard test, 1) is the correct answer and for a child to explicitly state this—their certainty index 
attached to hypothesis 1) should be fairly strong. In contrast, hypothesis 2) is the incorrect 
response but it is, indeed, the actual location of the ball. For the young child who fails such tests 
and responds with hypothesis 2) as representing Sally’s belief—this may be because of the 
perceptual salience of actual location of the ball, memory demands inhibiting the child’s ability 
to remember earlier events, or a combination of these possibilities. In the low-uncertainty 
condition of the present study—because Sally repeatedly places the ball into the basket—with 
each repetition, the child’s certainty index attached to hypothesis 1) should be strengthened. 
Thus in hypothesis space, there will be a shift towards hypothesis 1) as representing Sally’s 
belief because the child’s certainty regarding hypothesis 1) should be enhanced. This shift is 
expected to be a direct result of the repetition manipulation that facilitates successful processing 
of the explicit ToM system. 
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4.3 « Developmental Change in the Information Processing 
System of ToM » 
 Adequate processing of the explicit system requires an enriched information source and a 
significantly reduced level of uncertainty. The implicit system, on the other hand, does not 
operate in a similar fashion. Instead, it can make automatic mental state inferences using simple 
bottom-up processes that do not exert the executive resources that the explicit system exerts. 
In infancy, the implicit system is at play, thus rendering information enrichment a less relevant 
factor in its processing. But even if the implicit system requires a rich information source—it is 
often provided, as the overwhelming majority of infant studies include several familiarization 
trials during which the infant's certainty is increased via repetition.  
 In early childhood, the explicit system is typically tested. This system requires a myriad of 
cognitive abilities including working memory abilities, verbal comprehension and fluency skills, 
and inhibitory control (as outlined by performance accounts). Successful explicit belief-
reasoning also requires information richness, as delineated by information theory. Thus in early 
childhood, a predeveloped explicit ToM system requires a highly enriched information source. 
By adulthood, this explicit system becomes better developed and can generate accurate 
inferences more readily. Here, a more responsive information updating system operates and 
again, because explicit responses are required, information richness plays a role in mental state 
inferences. 
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 The five year old who passes explicit tests has now developed a more responsive and 
generative information updating system that can operate in spite of a relatively impoverished 
information source. In contrast, the three year old who fails requires a much richer information 
source to pass.  
4.4 « Study 1: Significance and Hypotheses » 
By applying an information-theoretic perspective, this study brings into question the 
impoverished nature of the information provided to children in standard false-belief tests. 
Relatedly, the study enriches the amount of information supporting a mental state inference, 
which will not only help delineate when children acquire a ToM—but critically, elucidate how, 
mechanistically, ToM operates. More broadly, this approach to studying ToM in children will 
explain a significant amount of prior research in one coherent framework, ultimately adding to 
the plethora of research findings that resolve the seemingly contradictory infant and preschool 
data.  
In light of the features of Information theory outlined above, it is expected that ToM 
operates through gradual uncertainty reduction, rendering the repetition manipulation of the LU - 
FB test a theoretically appropriate and well substantiated manipulation on children’s 
performance. The main hypotheses of the current study are simple:  
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1) A large proportion of children who fail the S-FB test will pass the LU-FB test. 
2) A considerably smaller proportion of children will show the reverse pattern (passing the S-FB 
test but failing the LU-FB test). 
Please note that we also included true-belief conditions in Study 1 but our main hypothesis was 
pertaining to false-belief conditions. For a deeper explanation of true-belief conditions and their 
utility in past studies as well as the present study, please see Appendix A. 
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Chapter 2 : Study 1 Methods 
5 « Participants » 
Eighty-two (45 females) typically developing preschool-aged children between 3 to 6 
years of age (M = 4.199; SD = 1.077) were recruited to participate in the current study. Children 
were recruited both by contacting their parents via telephone from Western University’s 
Developmental Participant Pool and by visiting local preschools in the London and surrounding 
area. Children were excluded from the analyses under the following conditions:  
1) If they had a neurological or psychological condition that impeded their ability to 
complete the tasks. Examples include delays in verbal comprehension or verbal fluency 
that may hinder their ability to understand the task and/or to respond to the questions 
asked of them; 
2) If they had a language barrier and no suitable translators were present to help them 
understand the tasks and/or the questions asked of them; 
3)  If they were unable to sit through all puppet shows (for false-belief analyses the two 
relevant puppet shows were the S-FB condition and the LU-FB condition; for true-belief 
analyses the two relevant puppet shows were the S-TB condition and the LU-TB 
condition); 
4) If they answered either of our control questions incorrectly. Specifically, we included 
two control questions to ensure that children were attending to and ultimately able to 
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understand the series of events presented to them. The first question was a memory 
question in which children were asked “Where did Sally put the ball?” in order to assess 
children’s memory of Sally’s behaviour. The second was a reality question in which 
children were asked “Where is the ball now?” that assessed children’s understanding of 
the current state of affairs. Only children who passed both memory and reality questions 
were included in the final analyses. 
 
Of the eighty-two children tested, seventy children were able to sit through both false-
belief conditions and sixty-four children were able to sit through both true-belief conditions. 
With respect to the false-belief conditions, forty (22 females) children (M age = 4.604; SD age = 
1.128) answered both memory and reality questions correctly and thus, were included in the final 
analysis. For true-belief conditions, thirty two (17 females) children (M age = 4.661; SD age = 
1.253) answered both memory and reality questions correctly and thus, were included in the final 
analysis. For a simpler depiction of the participant characteristics, please see Table 1 (below). 
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Table 1. Study 1 Participant Characteristics 
 
Conditions 
 
Children Recruited 
Children Able to 
Complete Both Standard 
and Low-Uncertainty 
Tasks 
Children Who 
Answered Both 
Memory and Reality 
Questions Correctly 
(Final Sample) 
 
 
False-Belief  
 
N = 82 
45 Females 
M age = 4.199 
SD age = 1.077 
 
N = 70 
40 Females 
M age = 4.271 
SD age = 1.087 
 
N = 40 
22 Females 
M age = 4.604 
SD age = 1.128 
 
True-Belief 
 
 
N = 82 
45 Females 
M age = 4.199 
SD age = 1.077 
 
N = 64 
38 Females 
M age = 4.268 
SD age = 1.125 
 
 
N = 32 
17 Females 
M age = 4.661 
SD age = 1.253 
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6 « Materials » 
6.1 « Study Design » 
The study design was that of a 2 (condition: standard, low-uncertainty) x 2 (belief status: 
true, false) with-subjects design. All children were shown a total of four puppet shows—the S-
FB task, the LU-FB task, the S-TB task, and the LU-TB task in no particular (random) order.  
To account for the possibility that children may become bored or that story scenarios will 
transfer across conditions—we introduced new characters and props for each puppet show. Our 
goal was to maintain the child’s interest and so, each puppet show included a slightly different—
albeit theoretically similar—storyline. Character names were generated by using an online baby 
name generator and objects were every-day, household objects that children typically interact 
with. We included both male and female puppet characters to ensure that children of both 
genders can identify with all puppets. For a complete list of all characters and props used in 
Study 1, please see Table 2 (below). 
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Table 2. Props Used in Interactive Puppet Shows 
 
 
Character 
Names 
 
Objects 
 
Containers 
(Locations) 
 
Task that First Character Engages in 
While Second Character Moves the 
Object  
 
Sally 
Blake 
Nina 
Peter 
Lilly 
Tom 
Anne 
Ron 
 
 
 
Ball 
Car 
Hair Brush 
Crayon 
Guitar 
Block 
 
 
Basket 
Treasure Chest 
Barrel 
Wooden Box 
Cup 
Little Box 
Blue Box 
Green Box 
 
 
“…takes a nap” 
“…goes for a walk” 
“…goes to the park” 
“…brushes his teeth” 
“…takes a bath” 
“…eats some food” 
 For each puppet show, the following were selected: two characters, one object, two 
locations, and a given task that the first agent completes while the second agent moves the 
object. To ensure that research assistants interacting with children remembered the series of 
events and to reduce the possibility of human error—they were provided with a generic script 
that they committed to memory. For an example of the specific script used, please see Table 3 
(below). 
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Table 3. Example Script from a Randomly Selected Puppet Show  
 
Task Type 
 
Script 
 
Test 
Questions 
(in order) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low-
Uncertainty 
False-Belief 
Test 
 
 
a) This is Sally [wave Sally] and this is Anne [wave Anne]. This 
is their ball [have both Sally and Anne touch ball 
simultaneously]. This is their box [have both Sally and Anne 
touch the box simultaneously] and this is their basket [have 
both Sally and Anne touch the basket simultaneously]. 
b) Look at Sally! Sally takes the ball and puts it into the basket 
[have Sally do this; play out other events that follow as well]. 
c) Then, Sally takes the ball out of the basket. 
d) Repeat b) and c) until Sally has placed the ball into the 
basket 3 times. 
e) Then, Sally gets very sleepy and leaves to go and take a nap 
[remove Sally from stage]. Now that Sally is taking a nap, can 
she see what we’re doing in here? Can she hear what is 
happening here? 
[Confirm with child that she can neither see nor hear what is 
happening in the room; do not continue until they verbally 
confirm “no” to each question in e)]. 
f) While Sally is sleeping, look what happens! Anne takes the 
ball out of the basket and puts it into the box [do this] and then 
Anne leaves [remove Anne from stage]. 
g) Remember Sally? Sally woke up from her nap and she’s 
come back to play! Sally wants to play with the ball [bring 
Sally back and have her “scratch her head as if thinking”] 
 
 
1) Where did 
Sally put the 
ball? 
 
2) Where is 
the ball now? 
 
3) Does Sally 
know it’s 
there? 
 
4) Where will 
Sally look for 
the ball? 
 
5) Why will 
she look in 
there? 
 
6) Where 
does Sally 
think the ball 
is? 
Importantly, prior to presenting any puppet show(s), we ensured that the following were 
randomized: 1) the props being used; 2) the side of the “stage” that each character is presented 
on; 3) the location in which the first character places the object; and 4) the order of the puppet 
32 
 
 
 
 
 
shows presented. We also asked a series of other test questions but for the purposes of this study, 
we were only interested in the canonical, critical test question that is bolded in Table 3.  
 For a clearer depiction of the main test conditions (S-FB and LU-FB) presented to each 
child—please see Table 4 (below).  
Table 4. Series of Events in Each Condition 
 Events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conditions 
 
Standard False-
Belief Task 
 
 
1) Sally throws the ball up and down 3 times and then 
she puts the ball into the basket. 
2) In Sally’s absence, Anne moves the ball from the 
basket to the box and leaves. 
3) Sally returns. 
 
 
Low-Uncertainty 
False-Belief Task 
 
 
1) Sally puts the ball into the basket (and takes it out) 
3 times. 
2) In Sally’s absence, Anne moves the ball from the 
basket to the box and leaves. 
3) Sally returns. 
 
As evident in Table 4, Standard and low-uncertainty conditions differ in the type of repeated 
behaviour presented. In the LU-FB condition, Sally repeatedly hides the ball into the basket, 
thereby strengthening the child’s representation of Sally’s belief that it is in the basket. However, 
in order to standardize the amount of time between standard and low-uncertainty conditions, we 
had Sally repeatedly throw the ball up and down at the beginning of the standard task. 
Importantly, the repetition in the S-FB task does nothing to influence Sally’s belief about the 
ball’s location but that in the LU-FB task should strengthen the child’s certainty of Sally’s belief 
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about the ball’s location (she really believes that it is in the basket because she put it in there so 
many times). 
7 « Procedure » 
We obtained informed consent from parents and verbal consent from children to 
participate. Children were situated in a testing room adjacent to an observation room in which 
their parents quietly sat and watched. Between both rooms was a two-way observational mirror 
such that from the testing room—it appeared to be a mirror. All puppets and props were placed 
in a closed suitcase underneath the table in order to ensure that children are not distracted by 
other toys and props during the stories presented. Research assistants were given the opportunity 
to bring a laptop onto which a PowerPoint slide of each randomized puppet show is presented. 
This was to ensure that participants are not eliminated due to researcher error. But to ensure that 
the added laptop in the room does not distract children, we asked research assistants to show the 
laptop to children at the outset of the study and to state the following: “this here just tells me 
what story we’re going to see next, okay?” after which children nodded. We found that simply 
explaining to children why there is a laptop behind them quenched their curiosity about it and 
thus, they were able to focus on the puppet shows presented. 
Next, the research assistant would go through each of the four puppet shows in random 
order. After being asked the test question (i.e. “where will Sally look for the ball?”), children 
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were given the opportunity to point to, touch, or verbally state which location they believe is 
correct. 
Meanwhile, in the observation room, parents watched their child interact with the 
research assistant. Once the child had completed all of the puppet shows, they were reunited with 
their parent(s) and given an opaque bag to choose a “mystery surprise toy” from. They were also 
given a $15.00 gift card to Indigo/Chapters/Coles and thanked for their time and participation. 
Each session took approximately 45 minutes to complete. 
During visits to local preschools, all procedures were identical to that of in-laboratory 
sessions. To ensure the children’s safety, we asked that a teaching assistant employed by the 
preschool be present during each session (analogous to parents watching children from the 
observation room during in-lab sessions). Children from preschools were thanked with a Curious 
George book along with a $15.00 gift card to Indigo/Chapters/Coles for their participation. 
We registered the procedure and analysis plan of Study 1 on the Open Science 
Framework (OSF; an online database that is part of a movement aimed at making scientific 
research more accessible and open). The OSF page for this study can be accessed via the 
following link: https://osf.io/4c7gm/. We have uploaded a word file on our OSF study page that 
addresses a series of typically asked questions regarding our study plan. This template was 
derived from the as predicted website (https://aspredicted.org/). All analyses discussed below are 
part of a-priori, hypothesis-driven analysis plans. Any other exploratory analyses that have not 
35 
 
 
 
 
 
been recorded on our OSF document (if conducted) are presented in the Appendices of this paper 
(rather than the main results sections). 
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Chapter 3 : Study 1 Results 
8 « Descriptive Statistics » 
8.1 « Hypothesized Pattern of Data » 
Our data consisted of proportions of children in each condition. For false-belief reasoning 
conditions, there are four cells into which all 40 children fell. The four possible cells are depicted 
in Table 5 (below). 
Table 5. Four Cells that Constitute Child Proportions in False-Belief Tasks 
 Passed LU-FB Test Failed LU-FB Test 
Passed S-FB Test 
 
Proportion P 
Passed Both 
 
Proportion O 
Odd Pattern 
Failed S-FB Test 
 
Proportion H 
Hypothesis 
 
Proportion F 
Failed Both 
 
As illustrated in Table 5, there are four possible proportions in the two false-belief tasks. 
For example, a proportion of children may pass both the standard and low-uncertainty false-
belief tasks (those in Proportion P; here, the “P” represents the word passed). We expected some 
children to comprise this proportion, as those who passed the standard test should surely pass the 
considerably easier low-uncertainty test. The opposite pattern can be seen in Proportion F in 
which children fail both the standard and low-uncertainty tests. We did not expect many children 
to comprise this proportion because if they failed the standard test, we expected them to now 
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pass our low-uncertainty test. The third possible cell is depicted in Proportion O in which 
children display an odd pattern of behavior. Specifically, children in this proportion pass the 
standard (and arguably more difficult) test of false-belief reasoning but strangely fail the low-
uncertainty (and theoretically easier) test of false-belief reasoning. This is a rather peculiar 
pattern of behavior and so, we did not predict that a substantial proportion of children would 
compromise Proportion O. Instead, we predicted that a significantly larger proportion of children 
would comprise Proportion H in which they fail the standard false-belief test but are able to pass 
the low-uncertainty test of false-belief reasoning. Because this experiment was predominantly 
aimed at understanding children’s false-belief understanding—we have focused our results on 
data from false-belief conditions. However, for an explanation of the hypothesized and actual 
pattern of data from true-belief conditions, please see Appendix B. 
8.2 « Actual Pattern of Data » 
Contrary to our hypotheses—the actual pattern of data do not appear to indicate that the 
manipulation helped children pass the low-uncertainty false-belief task. For descriptive statistics 
of the proportions of children in each condition, please see Table 6 (below).  
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Table 6. Actual Proportions of Children in Each Cell 
 Passed LU-FB Test Failed LU-FB Test 
Passed S-FB Test 
 
15 
 
2 
Failed S-FB Test 
 
3 
 
20 
Proportions of Children in Each Cell by Age 
 
 Passed LU-FB Test Failed LU-FB Test 
Passed S-FB Test 
 
15 
(3younger; 12older) 
 
2 
(1younger; 1older) 
Failed S-FB Test 
 
3 
(3younger; 0older) 
 
20 
(13younger; 7older) 
 
Proportions of Children in Each Cell by Sex 
 
 Passed LU-FB Test Failed LU-FB Test 
Passed S-FB Test 
 
15 
(7female; 8male) 
 
2 
(1female; 1male) 
Failed S-FB Test 
 
3 
(2female; 1male) 
 
20 
(12female; 8male) 
 
Note. Younger and older cohorts of children were delineated by conducting a median split of 
age (in months). Older and younger children constituted the upper and lower halves of the 
data, respectively.   
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9 « Inferential Statistics » 
We conducted McNemar’s χ2 test using the mcnemar.test statistical package in R (version 
3.3.2). Relative to children demonstrating the odd pattern of behavior (in which they pass the S-
FB test but fail the LU-FB test), we did not find that a larger proportion of children who fail the 
S-FB test will pass the LU-FB test, McNemar’s χ2(1) = 0.200, p = .655, effect size (odds ratio) = 
0.667. For a graphic illustration comparing the proportion of children passing the standard to the 
low-uncertainty false-belief test, please see Figure 1 (below).  
 
Figure 1. Bar plot illustrating the lack of difference between the proportion of children 
passing the S-FB test (43%), relative to those passing the LU-FB test (45%). 
For inferential statistics in true-belief conditions, please see Appendix B.   
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Chapter 4 : Discussion of Study 1 and Motivation Behind Study 2 
10 « Study 1: Main Findings » 
The results of Study 1 clearly do not support our prediction. As made evident by both the 
descriptive and inferential statistics of Study 1—the proportion of children who fall into 
Proportion H (in which we hypothesized many children to fall) was not significantly higher than 
those who fall into Proportion O (the odd pattern of behavior that we predicted very few children 
to show). Simply put, we can clearly see that our manipulation did not exert an effect on 
children, as those who pass the S-FB test typically also pass the LU-FB test and those who fail 
the S-FB test also tend to fail the LU-FB test. The goal of the sections that follow is to better 
understand the results of Study 1 by critically assessing the design, implementation, and 
theoretical perspective applied to this study. This discussion of our findings in Study 1 will set 
the foundation and motivation behind Study 2. 
10.1 « A Deeper Analysis of Study 1: Potential Reasons for 
Null Effects » 
One may reasonably argue that it is possible that—while it is true that our original sample 
size of children tested was large (N = 82)—our final sample size was small (N = 40). Due to time 
constraints and other practical considerations (i.e. successful completion of data collection for 
the purposes of this thesis), we did not meet our sample size goal. Within our OSF plan of study, 
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we conducted a power analysis using GPower 3.1 that resulted in a sample size goal of N = 89 
(https://osf.io/4c7gm/). Thus it is possible that one reason why we did not observe the effects that 
we predicted is because we were underpowered to detect such an effect. This criticism is a valid 
one and one that we could not avoid, as within a limited time constraint (of approximately one 
year’s time), we ambitiously recruited and tested over 80 preschool-aged participants. However, 
we lost over 50% of our data after applying our exclusion criteria. We could not avoid using 
these criteria (such as the requirement that children respond correctly to both memory and reality 
questions)—as they are the critical and canonical exclusion criteria used in past studies. We 
needed to ensure that the data that we obtain is as accurate a reflection of children’s mindreading 
capacity as possible and in this effort, we needed to be sure that each child understood the series 
of events presented in the puppet show(s). The problem of small final sample sizes in preschool 
aged populations is not specific to our study, as many other studies with young children also 
suffer of this limitation. For example, the Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) study had a mere 27 
typically developing children in their study. More recently, the study of false-belief reasoning 
with reduced processing demands (via response-generation practice trials) had 32 participants in 
experiment 1 and 16 participants in subsequent studies (Setoh et al., 2016). Thus the problem of 
small sample size is not unique to our study but is still, of course, a problem nonetheless. This 
was an inevitable limitation of our study and is problematic across studies with young 
populations.  
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However, in light of the fact that only three children (of the forty included in the final 
analysis) showed the pattern of behavior that we predicted—it is unlikely that increasing the 
sample size will result in a noticeable and significant shift in the findings. Because so few 
children demonstrated the pattern of behavior that we predicted—the likelihood that our results 
are solely due to our data being underpowered is potentially quite low. 
A second possible explanation for the null effects observed in Study 1 is that children 
who fail tests of false-belief reasoning genuinely lack the ability to reason about others’ mental 
states and we are unable to help them pass. But in light of the overwhelmingly amount of 
empirical evidence on infant belief tracking (Onishi, Baillargeon, 2005; Moll et al., 2016; 
Southgate et al., 2007; Surian et al., 2007)—this explanation is unlikely. The notion that 
preschoolers in our study who failed the S-FB test simply lack a ToM altogether (and thus cannot 
pass the LU-FB test) brings us back to the seemingly puzzling and contradictory infant and 
preschool data presented in chapter one. This explanation does not account for any of the infant 
data presented in the past nor does it address studies that have reduced performance demands for 
younger children and thus, increased their success rate. It is therefore unlikely that the genuine 
conceptual deficit explanation is the true culprit underlying our findings. 
A third possibility is that there are some inherent flaws in our repetition manipulation that 
limit its ability to exert any effect. Justifiably so, one may argue that perhaps our manipulation 
was not potent enough or even that its effects were simply different than those that we had 
originally intended. This possibility is actually quite likely, as all of my research assistants and I 
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noticed that following the repetition manipulation of LU-FB conditions—most children burst 
into uncontrollable laughter. This was particularly true for younger children who—instead of 
attending to and carefully thinking about Sally’s repeated hiding behavior—clearly thought the 
manipulation was silly. Our initial reaction to the first few children who displayed this behavior 
was that this might be specific to this child but as our sample size increased (and the tendency of 
children to laugh with the manipulation remained), we began carefully considering the reason(s) 
why they found it funny. As adults, we may not understand this as readily but in actuality, the 
manipulation is quite silly and funny. To repeatedly place an object into a location (by putting it 
in the basket, then taking it out of the basket; then putting it in the basket etc.) is strange, silly, 
and odd. Children recognized this and giggled uncontrollably when they saw this pattern of 
behavior. It is thus quite possible that (especially for the young preschooler) our manipulation 
did not exert the effect that we anticipated. When designing the study, we did not consider this 
outcome and (as is an issue across studies with young children), we were surprised to see 
children’s reactions when we implemented it. But in reality, they are right for laughing, as it is a 
silly, strange, and even funny course of action to take (to repeatedly place something into a 
container)! Thus in future investigations, we will aim to manipulate children’s certainty in ways 
that are hopefully more clear and that directly alter children’s certainty (rather than exerting 
some other, albeit emotionally positive, effect). 
And lastly, the fourth and final possible explanation for our null results pertains to the 
theoretical motivation behind the study. Namely, that ToM (and thus false-belief reasoning) 
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genuinely does not operate through information updating; as such, an information-theoretic 
approach to studying ToM through gradual uncertainty reduction may not be justified. This 
explanation—while seemingly well-substantiated and valid—is unlikely because uncertainty 
reduction via information updating is quite possibly the mechanism by which ToM operates in 
adults. It is therefore highly conceivable that the system operates similarly in early development. 
At this juncture, one may ask the following question: “on what basis are we basing the inference 
that adult ToM operates through uncertainty reduction via information updating (i.e. with an 
information-theoretic perspective)?”—and reasonably so. This statement is not on the basis of 
intuition or personal experience but on the foundation of the findings of Study 2.  
11 « Motivation behind Study 2 » 
In an effort to better understand and interpret the null findings of Study 1—we reflected 
back on the design, implementation, and theoretical framework of Study 1. This critical and 
reflective process inspired us to reflect on why we feel that the mechanism by which we make 
mental state inferences of others’ minds is through uncertainty-reduction algorithms. In theory, 
this might sound intuitive, obvious, and indisputable but indeed, this gradual belief updating on 
the basis of the informativeness of the stimulus may not be the mechanism by which we make 
belief attributions. We therefore applied an information-theoretic perspective to understanding 
how adults make inferences about other people’s mental states. We also addressed the potential 
problem(s) of boredom and humor associated with the repetition manipulation by more directly 
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manipulating the amount and type of information that participants are given when reading short 
vignettes about various characters. 
11.1 « Study 2: Design and Hypotheses » 
We included standard and low-uncertainty conditions during which participants read 
vignettes containing a moderate, or rich source of information to base a mental state inference 
on. But because adults have a considerably longer attention span than young preschoolers—this 
wealth of time afforded us the ability to also increase participants’ uncertainty with ambiguous, 
informationally impoverished, high-uncertainty conditions.  
The design of Study 2 was that of a one-way (condition: standard, low-uncertainty, high-
uncertainty) within-subjects design. All participants were exposed to 5 versions of the three 
possible story types making a total of 15 stories that each participant was exposed to. 
We made the following three hypotheses regarding our findings from Study 2:  
Using a within-subjects design, we will see an incremental pattern such that participants’ 
performance will be as follows: 1) Moderately high in standard conditions; 2) Significantly 
higher in low-uncertainty conditions; and 3) Lowest in high-uncertainty conditions.  
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Chapter 5 : Study 2 Methods 
12 « Participants » 
Sixty (29 females) healthy adult participants between 18 to 31 years of age (M = 20.600; 
SD = 3.288) were tested in Study 2. All participants were undergraduate students at Western 
University and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Three participants were excluded from 
the final analyses because they did not provide a complete dataset. The final sample consisted of 
fifty-seven (26 females) healthy adult participants between 18 to 31 years of age (M = 20.632; 
SD = 3.368).  
13 « Materials » 
The materials used in Study 2 consisted of a series of short vignettes (stories about 
fictional characters) presented on a computer screen. Specifically, a total of 15 short vignettes 
were given to each participant to read. After carefully reading each vignette, participants were 
shown a series of questions that assessed their ability to reason about the mental state(s) of the 
main character in the vignette. All vignettes were presented (and subsequent responses to 
questions pertaining to each vignette were collected) using OpenSesame Experiment Builder 
2.9.7.  
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13.1 « Randomization Technique for Vignettes » 
With respect to content within the vignettes, we wanted to ensure that personal biases do 
not influence the topics of each story and so, all aspects of each story were generated randomly 
using the following four steps: 
1) Each story consisted of a character whose gender was decided using a random number 
generator and whose name was decided using the following random baby name generator 
online: http://www.randomnames.com/.  
2) The element onto which the character would have a set of mental states about could be 
a person, place, thing, or phenomenon and this was decided using a random number 
generator.  
3) If it was a person, then the name and gender were decided in the same way that those 
of the first character were generated. If it was a place, thing, or phenomenon, then the 
following random generators online were used: https://www.randomlists.com/random-
world-cities, https://www.randomlists.com/things, and 
http://www.ratespeeches.com/t=Speech-Topics, respectively.  
4) Once the element onto which the agent has a mental state was decided, using a random 
number generator, whether or not the character agrees, likes, wants (i.e. approaches) or 
disagrees, dislikes, hates (i.e. avoids) the element was generated randomly. 
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For example, a male (step 1) named Lewis (step 2) has a set of mental states (beliefs, thoughts, 
knowledge, emotions, and behavioral intentions) about a second character named Clara’s piano 
playing (step 3); in particular, Lewis likes (approach; step 4) Clara’s piano playing.  
13.2 « Test Questions » 
After participants carefully read each vignette, they were shown a series of test questions 
assessing their ability to reason about the character in the vignette’s mental state(s). In order to 
more comprehensively capture the constituent aspects of ToM, participants were asked questions 
that assessed their ability to reason about the character’s beliefs, thoughts, knowledge, emotions, 
and behavioral intentions. For belief questions, the word “believes” was included in a true or 
false formatted question such as the following: “Lewis believes that Clara is musically talented”. 
For questions about others’ thoughts and knowledge, the words “thinks” and “knows” were 
included in a similar format. For questions evaluating participants’ ability to reason about the 
emotions of others, the six basic emotions of happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, and 
disgust (Ekman, 1992) were used in multiple choice style questions such as the following:  
“when Lewis listens to Clara play the piano, how does he feel?” along with the six basic 
emotions as response options ranging from a) to f). 
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13.3 « The Standard Task » 
The standard task was intended to be moderately difficult in that it provides participants 
with a reasonable (but not substantial) amount of information onto which participants can base a 
mental-state inference. Importantly, the information that participants were given included 
behaviours and not direct statements about the given character’s mental states. This way, we 
could ensure that participants are not simply memorizing scripts from the text provided but are 
actually making a mental state attribution based on the behaviour and disposition of the 
character(s) presented. Standard conditions began with a brief introduction followed by a total of 
six sentences—two of which presented information that was consistent with the agent’s mental 
state(s), while the remaining four sentences served as length-fillers that ensure consistency 
across conditions in the amount of text displayed in each vignette. It is noteworthy that the order 
of each sentence type (be that consistent or filler) was randomized. For an example of a story 
within the standard condition, please see Appendix C. 
13.4  « The Low-Uncertainty Task » 
The low-uncertainty task was intended to be exceptionally easy in that it provides 
participants with a substantial amount of information onto which participants can base a mental-
state inference. These conditions were identical to standard conditions with the exception that 
rather than two consistent-information sentences—participants were given six sentences that are 
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consistent with the agent’s mental state(s). Like standard conditions, low-uncertainty conditions 
began with a brief introduction, but a total of six sentences followed—all of which presented 
information that was consistent with the agent’s mental state(s). Here, as new information comes 
in, there should be reduced ambiguity, confusion, and uncertainty regarding the agent’s mental 
state(s). For an example of a story within the low-uncertainty condition, please see Appendix D. 
13.5  « The High-Uncertainty Task » 
The high-uncertainty task was intended to be exceptionally difficult in that it provides 
participants with a cryptic set of information designed to increase participants’ confusion and 
essentially, their level of uncertainty. In addition to the typical introductory sentence, participants 
were given conflicting information such that three sentences provided participants with 
consistent information—consistent with the agent’s set of mental state(s)—and three sentences 
provided participants with inconsistent information (directly contradicting consistent sentences). 
In these vignette types, as new information comes in, there should be increased ambiguity, 
confusion, and uncertainty regarding the agent’s mental state(s). For an example of a story within 
the high-uncertainty condition, please see Appendix E. 
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14 « Design Features of Study 2 » 
14.1  « Technique for Topic Matching » 
Despite the fact that vignette topics were generated using the randomization technique 
outlined in 12.1—it is still possible that story topics for low-uncertainty vignettes (by chance) 
happen to be simpler than those in, say, high-uncertainty vignettes. We therefore decided to take 
an additional precaution to ensure that story topics are matched across conditions. Thus for each 
story topic (i.e. the story about Lewis), we generated a standard, low-uncertainty, and high-
uncertainty version. Participants each saw a total of fifteen vignettes, five of which were standard 
story versions, five of which were low-uncertainty story versions, and five of which were high-
uncertainty story versions.  
14.2  « Accuracy Measure » 
To obtain an accuracy measure for each condition from participants, we obtained their 
responses to each of the five (believe, think, know, emotion, and intention) test questions 
presented after each vignette. For the standard condition, for example, each participant read five 
standard vignettes after which five questions were asked. Therefore, for this condition, 
participants each provided responses to a total of twenty-five questions—resulting in a calculated 
accuracy score out of twenty-five for the standard condition. The same logic was applied to the 
low and high-uncertainty conditions. It is noteworthy that we also generated reaction time 
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measures but our main hypotheses surrounded the extent to which the amount and type of 
information that participants are given influences their final mental-state attribution(s)—their 
performance accuracy. 
15 « Procedure » 
Prior to collecting any data for Study 2, we preregistered our study on OSF. The 
preregistration page as well as the as predicted document for this study can be found via the 
following link: https://osf.io/89wr4/. All analyses discussed in the results section are part of a-
priori, hypothesis-driven analysis plans. Any other exploratory analyses that have not been 
recorded on our OSF document (if conducted) are presented in the Appendices of this paper.  
After providing written consent to participate in the study, participates were seated in 
front of a computer screen and told that in a few moments, they will see a series of short stories 
(“paragraphs of text”) appear on the screen. They were instructed to read each story as carefully 
as possible and were reassured that they will have ample time to read all of the stories presented. 
They were then told that once they are comfortable with their knowledge of each story, they may 
press any key on the keyboard and this will generate a series of questions pertaining to the story 
they just read. They were specifically told to focus their attention on “getting the answers right” 
rather than quickly reading and answering questions. Once they confirmed that they understand 
the instructions, the research assistant started the computer task and participants began reading. 
To answer True or False type test questions, participants pressed the “t” or “f” keys to indicate 
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that the statement is true or false, respectively. To answer Multiple Choice style questions, 
participants simply pressed the key corresponding to their choice (i.e. “a” to choose option a). 
Once finished, participants were given one full research course credit for their participation and 
were thanked for their time. The entire session took approximately 45 minutes to complete.  
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Chapter 6 : Study 2 Results 
16 « Descriptive Statistics » 
Descriptive statistics of Study 2 indicate trends in support of our predictions. That is, 
performance (accuracy) was moderately high in the standard condition (M = 75.000; SD = 
10.590), highest in the low-uncertainty condition (M = 81.965; SD = 8.606), and lowest in the 
high-uncertainty condition (M = 52.754; SD = 11.891).  
17 « Inferential Statistics » 
A repeated-measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) conducted using the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences Software (SPSS) revealed that there is a statistically significant 
effect of condition on accuracy, F(1,56) = 115.064, p < .0001, η2 = .673. Follow-up pairwise 
comparisons revealed that at all three levels, there is a significant difference. Results of the 
pairwise comparisons are depicted in Table 7 (below). 
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Table 7. Results of the Pairwise Comparisons between the Three Conditions 
Comparisons Mean Difference p-value 
Standard vs.  
Low-Uncertainty 
 
-6.965* 
 
<.0001*** 
Standard vs.  
High-Uncertainty 
 
22.246* 
 
<.0001*** 
Low-Uncertainty vs.  
High-Uncertainty 
 
29.211* 
 
<.0001*** 
For a graphical illustration of the results of Study 2, please see Figure 2 (below). 
 
 
Figure 2. Bar plot illustrating the main findings of Study 2. 
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 Because our main findings concerned participants’ performance accuracy across 
condition types—we presented accuracy data for Study 2 in this chapter. For reaction time data, 
please see Appendix F.  
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Chapter 7 : Study 2 Discussion 
18 « Study 2: Limitations » 
 Unlike study 1, we not only met but exceeded our sample size goal with study 2. Our 
OSF preregistration document for Study 2 includes a power analysis using GPower 3.1 that 
resulted in a sample size goal of N = 45 (https://osf.io/89wr4/). Our actual sample size for Study 
2 was N = 57. Thus although sample size is clearly not a limitation of study 2—the 
generalizability of the sample under study is. All participants included in the final analyses for 
study 2 were recruited from Western University and consisted of students taking undergraduate 
psychology courses or of graduate students in the department of psychology. This sample clearly 
does not reflect the general population, as all participants are from a relatively young, educated 
sample of North American participants. Although generalizability is often a limitation with 
studies in psychology and related fields—the mere fact that it is a common practice to recruit 
university students as participants does not justify it. We recruited an unrepresentative sample of 
the general population for several reasons: convenience, efficiency, compensation cost, and 
necessity. This sample was a convenient sample that could be efficiently tested with no cost 
(they were given course credit) in a considerably short amount of time.  
 Another critique of study 2 worth addressing is the external validity of the tasks used. In 
real-world interactions, we are not faced with vignettes in the form of a paragraph of text on a 
computer screen from which to make a mental-state inference. Instead, we are given a multitude 
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of cues from which to base a ToM attribution. Missing from our stimuli are facial cues, bodily 
gestures, and changes in an agent’s vocal pitch—all of which may contribute to participants’ 
certainty regarding the agent’s belief status. The reasons why we implemented tasks with such 
low external validity pertain to the ease of administration and convenience of using these tasks. 
We also feel that our tasks are internally valid in that there is a considerable amount of control in 
the details pertaining to each story that are used. The randomization technique and matched story 
content across conditions were some ways in which we increased the internal validity and 
reduced the potential for noise influencing the results of study 2. Despite the virtues of the 
internal validity and control of the vignettes used in study 2, follow-up research with greater 
external validity is warranted.  
 A third critique of study 2 pertains to the test questions asked after the presentation of 
each vignette. Of the five question types asked (emotion, believe, think, know, and behaviour 
prediction), the first question type (emotion reasoning) suffers from a great limitation. In an 
effort to reduce the possibility of linguistic ambiguity in the emotions presented—we presented 
participants with only the six basic emotions (Ekman, 1992). However, for some scenarios, it 
may have very well been possible that the likely way in which the character in the vignette was 
feeling was not happy, sad, angry, disgusted, surprised, or afraid. This renders it possible that 
participants simply chose the best possible option and not the way in which they truly believed 
the character to feel. To address this, open-ended questions should be used in future studies in 
which participants enter an emotional feeling (i.e. excited) that they attribute to the character. 
59 
 
 
 
 
 
Afterwards, participant responses can be qualitatively analyzed by independent coders. But to 
increase our efficiency, we included close-ended questions in multiple-choice format.  
To address all of the concerns discussed in this section, more representative samples of 
the population should be tested using more externally valid tasks. Examples of such tasks include 
video vignettes that portray facial expressions, body language, and vocal intonation as a basis for 
participants to generate mental state inferences on. And finally, dependent variables should be 
open-ended, allowing participants to think beyond the limited set of options given in close-ended 
questionnaires. 
19 « Study 2: Main Findings and Interpretation » 
Despite these limitations, the main findings of Study 2 are interesting and insightful, 
nonetheless. Study 2 manipulated participants’ levels of uncertainty when making mental state 
attributions by altering the informativeness of a series of vignettes. If the underlying mechanism 
by which ToM operates in adults is that of gradual uncertainty reduction with the onset of new 
information—then we should observe a difference in the final ToM inferences that adults make 
as a function of the condition of each vignette. Results of Study 2 confirmed our hypotheses by 
revealing that performance is moderately high when participants are provided with a small 
(albeit consistent) amount of information to base mental state attributions on. Performance then 
increases considerably as the amount of consistent information is increased—thereby enriching 
the information source by which participants form a ToM. We also show in Study 2 that we can 
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hinder performance by altering the final mental state attribution that participants make with an 
informationally ambiguous, uncertainty-provoking condition. Taken together, this set of findings 
substantiate the view that ToM operates via a gradual uncertainty-reduction, belief-updating 
mechanism in which final inferences are updated as new, consistent information is obtained. In 
light of these data with adults, it is possible that a similar (albeit potentially less sophisticated) 
mechanism operates early in development. 
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Chapter 8 : General Discussion 
20 « Study 1 and 2: A Brief Comparison » 
Due to the design and implementation limitations outlined in chapter 4—Study 1 could 
not adequately assess the utility of information-theory in understanding preschoolers’ mental 
state reasoning capacities. The way in which Study 1 enriched preschoolers’ belief certainty of 
another agent was via repetition in a standard Sally-Anne test of false-belief reasoning. The 
manipulation of repetition was based on the logic that with each iterative display during which 
Sally hid the ball in the basket, we can systematically reduce the child’s uncertainty regarding 
Sally’s belief about the ball’s location. This design—while in theory and seemingly in practice 
well-justified—produced an interesting, but unintended, effect. In practice, children found the 
manipulation silly and laughed (rather than carefully attending to the scenario). It is also possible 
that the repetitive nature of the manipulation prevented children from obtaining a rich body of 
information from multiple sources (as was done in the adult study). Recall that in the adult study, 
participants in the low-uncertainty condition did not simply repeatedly read the same sentence—
but were given multiple pieces of convergent information onto which a cohesive set of mental 
state attributions can be generated. Thus relative to the adult study (Study 2), the preschool study 
(Study 1) did not enrich participants’ information source in an effective, potent, or 
comprehensive manner.  
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21 « Future Research Goals: The Necessity of Study 3 » 
Instead, a similar (but child-appropriate) set of vignettes that systematically enriches 
children’s information source is warranted. Returning back to the literature on ToM 
development, the field is increasingly adopting the Substantial Continuity View instead of the 
previously held Fundamental Conceptual Change View. This shift was largely a consequence of 
the plethora of research findings indicating that children far below 4-5 years of age (in many 
cases, young infants) have the capacity to track mental states (Scott & Baillargeon, 2017). The 
competence-performance distinction (in which young children who fail explicit tests of false-
belief reasoning simply cannot overcome performance demands in the task—but nonetheless 
have ToM competence) helps resolve the seemingly conflicting body of infant and preschool 
data (Setoh et al., 2016; Surian & Leslie, 1999; Yazdi et al., 2006). Missing in the literature, 
however, is the perspective that the impoverished nature of information provided to young 
preschoolers serves as a performance demand, preventing their ability to make a verbally explicit 
belief-attribution. This perspective is motivated by information-theory (Balsam & Gallistel, 
2009) and the field is wanting of its application in the domain of ToM.  
21.1  « Study 3: Design » 
In Study 3, we hope to address the necessity for a study that systematically reduces 
children’s uncertainty regarding the mental states of others. In Study 3, we aim to more 
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effectively manipulate the richness of children’s information source with child-appropriate 
vignettes that differ in the amount and consistency of information that they provide children 
with. In addition to a set of standard cartoon vignettes (taken from the Theory of Mind Battery; 
Hutchins, Prelock & Chace, 2008), we will include a set of low-uncertainty and high-uncertainty 
vignettes. The purpose of the low-uncertainty vignettes is to assess the extent to which young 
children (who fail standard tests of mental state reasoning) can pass with an informationally 
enriched set of similar vignettes. And finally, using the same logic applied when creating the 
high-uncertainty vignettes of Study 2, we will determine whether or not older children (who pass 
standard tests of mental state reasoning) fail with an ambiguous, uncertainty-provoking set of 
information.  
Specifically, vignettes in the standard condition will provide children with a moderate 
amount of consistent information—after which the remaining sentences will serve as length 
fillers. For example, the character Patty from one of the existing stories in the ToM-Battery 
(Hutchins et al., 2008) thinks that her glasses are on the table. In the standard condition, children 
will be given one piece of information consistent with this mental state; namely, that “this 
morning, Patty saw her glasses on the table”. This is the standard amount of information—
identical to that provided in the existing vignette within the ToM-Battery. To increase length 
such that vignettes in the standard condition are equivalent in length to those in other conditions, 
we will include filler sentences (as was done in the standard condition of Study 2). Vignettes in 
the low-uncertainty condition, on the other hand, will provide children with a substantial amount 
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of consistent information—enriching the child’s certainty of the character in the story’s set of 
mental states. For example, in addition to the information provided in the standard condition, 
children will be given additional information such as the following: “Yesterday, Patty’s 
babysitter asked her why she left her glasses on the table”. These additional sentences provide 
the child with more consistent information—consistent with the agent’s mental states (i.e. that 
Patty thinks her glasses are on the table). The third and final types of vignettes (those in the high-
uncertainty condition) will provide children with conflicting information such that some 
sentences are consistent with the character’s mental states (i.e. that Patty thinks her glasses are 
on the table) and others that are inconsistent with the character’s mental states (i.e. that Patty 
does not think that her glasses are on the table). Examples of such sentences are as follows: “this 
morning Patty saw her glasses on the table” and “but by supper time, Patty saw that her glasses 
were not on the table”. For example stimuli from the standard, low-uncertainty, and high-
uncertainty conditions, please see Appendices G, H, and I, respectively. 
21.2  « Study 3: Predictions and Significance » 
We plan on implementing the same design characteristics as those applied in Study 2. 
That is, we will use a within-subjects design and create story topics using the same 
randomization and matching procedure as outlined in chapter 5. Like the hypotheses outlined for 
study 2 (in chapter 4), we predict the following: 
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Like the findings of Study 2, Study 3 will discover an incremental pattern such that children’s 
performance will be as follows: 1) Moderately high in standard conditions; 2) Significantly 
higher in low-uncertainty conditions; and 3) Lowest in the high-uncertainty conditions.  
This will be the first well-controlled study of ToM development to apply an information-
theoretic perspective in delineating the performance demands of information richness when 
children complete tests of mental state reasoning.  
22 « Concluding Remarks » 
22.1  « A More In-Depth Discussion of Each Study » 
The purpose of Study 1 was to apply an information-theoretic approach to understanding 
ToM. Findings from Study 1 suggest that in children, the repetition manipulation as a means of 
reducing uncertainty has no effect. Instead, Study 1 elucidated the necessity for robust and 
effective manipulations of uncertainty reduction. The purpose of Study 2 was to discern how 
ToM operates in adults. The results of Study 2 confirmed that manipulating informational 
richness more directly using vignettes does influence adults’ final mental state attributions. More 
specifically, Study 2 demonstrated that a) the mechanism by which adults form mental state 
attributions is via a gradual and integrative updating process of ToM-relevant and consistent 
information; b) final mental state attributions can be manipulated via uncertainty-reduction and 
uncertainty-amplification; and c) vignettes in which various types of information converge to 
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generate a set of mental states serve as an effective and robust manipulation of uncertainty in 
tests of ToM. And finally, the purpose of Study 3 is to discern how we can better manipulate 
informational richness more directly with children. The goal of Study 3 is to create child-
appropriate vignettes in which we apply the logic of the design and implementation of Study 2 to 
address the outstanding research questions that motivated the theoretical foundation of Study 1. 
Once complete, all three studies will provide important scientific insights to both the research 
and general community of the mechanisms by which—or how—ToM develops. 
22.2  « Revisiting the Competence-Performance Distinction 
and Information Theory » 
As demonstrated by the literature reviewed in Chapter 1, a considerable amount of debate 
and controversy surrounds the issue of ToM development. Early research studies on ToM 
development found strong support for the notion that there is a discontinuous shift during early 
preschool in which children suddenly acquire the ability to infer mental states. This fundamental 
conceptual change view—while substantiated by evidence that young preschoolers fail explicit 
tests of ToM—has come under criticism by a growing number of contradictory research findings. 
That is, recent findings from implicit ToM tests are increasingly suggesting that some belief-
tracking abilities exist in young infants. These findings bring into question the fundamental 
conceptual change view and warrant the following developmental research question: If infants 
can track mental states, why do young preschoolers fail tests of mental state reasoning?  
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One explanation for these seemingly opposing views is that perhaps there is a substantial 
amount of continuity in ToM abilities throughout the lifespan. These abilities are captured well 
with implicit ToM tests administered to infants but explicit tests given to preschoolers pose 
additional task demands that prevent children from passing. These additional, non-focal task 
demands may include demands on working memory, verbal comprehension, verbal fluency, and 
inhibitory control. Importantly, these demands may hinder children from demonstrating their true 
mind-reading capacity and thus, their performance is compromised. One task demand that has 
yet to be investigated pertains to the impoverished nature of the information provided in explicit 
ToM tests given to young children. In accordance with information theory, when information 
provided by the stimulus is low, uncertainty will concomitantly increase. From this standpoint, 
young children who fail explicit ToM tests may simply require a richer source of information in 
order to reduce their level of belief-uncertainty. By using this information-theoretic perspective, 
we may better understand the seemingly puzzling findings of research on ToM development. 
This was the motivation behind Study 1 and although results did not confirm that manipulating 
uncertainty via repetition has an effect on children—there are several reasons why we should 
take caution before concluding that young children cannot pass ToM tests because they simply 
lack a ToM.  
First, to conclude that young children cannot be helped and simply cannot pass because 
of a conceptual deficit in ToM ignores the overwhelmingly large and cogent body of infant data 
on belief-tracking. Second, this conclusion would also disregard the experiments conducted with 
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preschoolers outlined in Chapter 1 during which various task demands were reduced and 
resultantly, many preschoolers were then able to successfully pass. And third, concluding that the 
findings of Study 1 support the fundamental conceptual change view would neglect the many 
practical considerations and critiques of the design and implementation of Study 1. Critically, 
many young children found the repetition manipulation of Study 1 to be humorous and laughed, 
rather than carefully attending to the scenario presented to them. Upon further reflection, it 
became evident to us that young children’s reasoning for finding the manipulation to be silly is 
well-warranted (as it, indeed, is silly to repeatedly place a ball into a basket). This brings into 
question the validity of the repetition manipulation in Study 1 as a means for reducing 
uncertainty. It is for these reasons that the results of Study 1 do not negate the utility of 
information theory in understanding ToM but simply warrant more direct manipulations of 
uncertainty. 
Study 2 manipulated informational richness more directly by administering vignettes that 
alter the amount and type of information provided in the stimulus. The goal of Study 2 was to 
assess whether or not the mechanism by which ToM operates is, in actuality, via uncertainty-
reduction. Applying an information-theoretic perspective to understanding ToM may not have 
been appropriate, as perhaps ToM genuinely does not operate through such a mechanism. Thus, 
testing information-theory more directly in adults was well-warranted and tested in Study 2. In 
adults, the type and amount of information provided in the stimulus had a profound role in 
altering the final mental state attributions made. It is logical to assume that at the outset of Study 
69 
 
 
 
 
 
2, participants had no mental state attributions about the characters in each vignette. Thus they 
had no prior ToM hypotheses about the agents in each vignette. In a similar manner as the 
operation of Bayesian models of cognitive reasoning (Gopnik et al., 2004; Perfors et al., 2011), 
we found that incoming information altered the final mental state attributions made. It is critical 
to note that there are three stages underlying this process of changing mental state attributions: 1) 
informational-richness provided in the stimulus; 2) uncertainty-reduction/amplification; 3) final 
mental state attributions made. In Study 2, we altered 1) and found concomitant changes in 3) but 
importantly, we did not test whether or not this was because of 2). However, it is a reasonable 
and logically valid assumption that altering informational richness will alter the certainty index 
which will, in turn, result in a given set of mental state attributions. In future investigations, it 
would perhaps be fruitful to test this by simply asking participants to rate their certainty level 
when making mental state inferences.  
22.3 « Final Thoughts: Information Theory across 
Development » 
 The findings of Study 2 confirm that adequate processing of the explicit system requires, at 
least in part, an enriched information source which should, in theory, significantly reduce the 
level of uncertainty. Whether or not the ToM system operates in a similar fashion in early 
development (i.e. during early preschool) warrants testing in Study 3. However, the data 
provided by Study 2 do provide useful insights as to the mechanism by which the explicit system 
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operates. These data can potentially help in understanding the contradictory preschool and infant 
data on the development of ToM. Recall that in infancy, the implicit system is at play, whereas in 
preschoolers—the explicit system is tested. One view may be that evidence of belief-tracking in 
infants is simply reflective of the system engaged—the implicit ToM system. This system may 
seamlessly operate even in the face of an impoverished set of information. While it is possible 
that the implicit system can function in a rudimentary, automatic sense in the absence of an 
enriched information source—this possibility has yet to be tested. However, even if the implicit 
system did require a rich information source—this is often provided in infant studies in which 
familiarization trials provide additional consistent information via repetition.  
 The explicit system, on the other hand, requires a plethora of cognitive abilities (as addressed 
by performance accounts) in addition to rich information source (as outlined by Study 2). Thus 
children who fail explicit tests of ToM may not have a fully-developed explicit mental state 
reasoning system and therefore require a highly enriched information source. Children who pass, 
on the other hand, may have a more developed explicit system in which they are able to extract 
relevant pieces of information from a social scenario and generate a cohesive set of mental state 
inferences—albeit from an informationally impoverished source. These children (who typically 
tend to be older), mimic the explicit mind-reading system of adults. By adulthood, the explicit 
system is enhanced and is able to extract ToM-relevant pieces of information from various 
sources of information more readily. In doing this, the system is able to generate a set of accurate 
and cohesive mental-state inferences on the basis of the informational richness of the stimulus.  
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Appendices  
Appendix A: A Deeper Explanation of True-Belief Conditions 
Consistent with previous studies of false-belief reasoning, we also included true-belief 
conditions as control trials during which the agent does not have a false-belief. Here, Sally sees 
Anne move the ball and thus, she has a true-belief about its location. True-belief conditions are 
considerably easier than false-belief conditions because there are now no processing demands 
requiring the child to overcome the temptation to locate the ball’s actual location (as in false-
belief conditions). That is, the true location of the ball is also the location in which Sally believes 
it to be located. Of course, when children pass true-belief conditions it is unclear whether or not 
it is because they are truly reasoning about Sally’s beliefs or because they are simply locating the 
ball based on their own beliefs.  
For matched true-belief conditions, we included the standard true-belief (S-TB) task in 
addition to a low-uncertainty true-belief (LU-TB) task. Consistent with previous studies, during 
the S-TB task, Sally placed the ball into the basket after which she left. She then returned and 
saw Anne move the ball from the basket to the box. During the LU-TB task, after Sally’s return, 
she saw Anne move the ball from the basket to the box repeatedly. Here, the LU-TB condition is 
matched in its series of events to the LU-FB condition with the exception that in true-belief 
conditions, Sally possesses a true belief. Based on the aforementioned literature reviewed in 
78 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1—most preschoolers should pass true-belief tasks. The series of events in the true-
belief conditions of the present study were as follows: 
 
Events 
 
 
 
 
Condition 
 
Standard True-
Belief Task 
 
 
1) Sally throws the ball up and down 3 times and then 
she puts the ball into the basket. 
2) In Sally’s presence, Anne moves the ball from the 
basket to the box and leaves. 
3) Sally remains. 
 
 
Low-Uncertainty 
True-Belief Task 
 
 
1) Sally puts the ball into the basket. 
2) In Sally’s presence, Anne moves the ball from the 
basket to the box and takes it in and out of the box 3 
times and leaves. 
3) Sally remains. 
 
It is noteworthy that the repetition in the standard condition is not meant to alter Sally’s belief 
status but simply to act as an equivalent control to the low-uncertainty task. The low-uncertainty 
task, however, does include repetition that should strengthen Sally’s belief (she saw it go into the 
box 3 times and therefore should believe it to be there with more certainty). Children were 
expected to do well in both standard and low-uncertainty true-belief tasks. 
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Appendix B: Hypothesized and Actual Data from True-Belief Conditions 
Hypothesized Pattern of Data 
For true-belief reasoning conditions, our prediction was simple—the majority of children 
will pass all tests of true-belief reasoning. But because the manipulation in the LU-TB condition 
strengthened children’s certainty regarding Sally’s true-belief of the ball’s location—more 
children should pass the LU-TB condition (relative to the S-TB condition). Importantly, 
however, we did not predict that these results will be as robust as those in false-belief conditions. 
Furthermore, if we found that more children pass the LU-TB condition (as compared to those 
passing the S-TB condition), we would not be sure whether or not they passed because they were 
more certain about Sally’s belief—or because they were more certain about where the ball really 
is because the repetition here can influence either or both factors. 
Actual Pattern of Data: Descriptive Statistics 
 Of the 32 children tested, 19 passed both the S-TB and the LU-TB test, while only 5 
children failed both the S-TB and LU-TB test. We expected a large proportion of children to pass 
true-belief conditions and so, this finding was consistent with our predictions. Two children 
passed the S-TB test and failed the LU-TB test and the remaining six children failed the S-TB 
test but passed the LU-TB test. Critically, it is unclear whether or not these six children passed 
the LU-TB test because they were more certain of Sally’s true belief of the ball’s location, or 
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because they, themselves were more certain of the ball’s location and simply used their own 
knowledge as a basis for their answer.  
Actual Pattern of Data: Inferential Statistics 
When we ran McNemar’s test, we did not find that these six children comprise a larger 
proportion than those showing the reverse pattern of behavior, McNemar’s χ2(1) = 2.00, p = 
.157, effect size (odds ratio) = 0.333. 
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Appendix C: A Sample of Stimuli used in the Standard Condition of Study 2 
Introduction: Meet Lewis. Lewis has a roommate named Clara. Clara plays the piano. 
Filler 1. Lewis speaks four languages because growing up, his father was a linguist who 
encouraged Lewis to learn multiple languages. 
Filler 2. Lewis and Clara’s apartment is in downtown Chicago, which can get very expensive. 
Luckily, their landlord covers the cost of utilities. 
Consistent 1. Lewis spends most of his evenings listening to Clara play the piano. After several 
hours of listening to her play, Lewis often goes to the kitchen. 
Filler 3. He then makes himself a cup of camomile tea to help him fall asleep. 
Consistent 2. One day, Lewis came across an advertisement to join the local orchestra. Lewis 
took a copy of the advertisement home and gave it to Clara. 
Filler 4. That night, Lewis’s mother called and when they spoke, Lewis asked his mother if they 
would be visiting Chicago over the holidays. 
Please note that bolded and underlined sections of text (above) were not included in the 
text presented to participants but are depicted here for illustrative purposes in demonstrating the 
utility of each sentence.  
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Appendix D: A Sample of Stimuli used in the Low-Uncertainty Condition of Study 2 
Introduction: Meet Lewis. Lewis has a roommate named Clara. Clara plays the piano. 
Consistent 1. Lewis spends most of his evenings listening to Clara play the piano.  
Consistent 2. After several hours of listening to her play, Lewis often smiles and applauds. 
Consistent 3. When Clara’s piano needed tuning, Lewis paid to have it done professionally. 
Consistent 4. Lewis regularly organizes social get-togethers in their apartment and asks Clara to 
play the piano for their friends. 
Consistent 5. He even once videotaped Clara playing the piano and uploaded the video on 
Youtube for the world to see. 
Consistent 6. One day, Lewis came across an advertisement to join the local orchestra. Lewis 
took a copy of the advertisement home and gave it to Clara. 
 
Please note that bolded and underlined sections of text (above) were not included in the 
text presented to participants but are depicted here for illustrative purposes in demonstrating the 
utility of each sentence.  
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Appendix E: A Sample of Stimuli used in the High-Uncertainty Condition of Study 2 
Introduction: Meet Lewis. Lewis has a roommate named Clara. Clara plays the piano. 
Consistent 1. Lewis spends most of his evenings listening to Clara play the piano.  
Inconsistent 1. After several hours of listening to her play, Lewis often gets a headache. 
Inconsistent 2. He once went to the mall across the street and bought a pair of noise-cancelling 
headphones. 
Consistent 2. When Clara’s piano needed tuning, Lewis paid to have it done professionally. 
Inconsistent 3. During a social get-together at their apartment, Clara played the piano and Lewis 
wore earplugs during her performance. 
Consistent 3. One day, Lewis came across an advertisement to join the local orchestra. Lewis 
took a copy of the advertisement home and gave it to Clara. 
 
Please note that bolded and underlined sections of text (above) were not included in the 
text presented to participants but are depicted here for illustrative purposes in demonstrating the 
utility of each sentence.  
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Appendix F: Reaction Time Data for Study 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of reaction time data for Study 2 are as follows: participants’ 
reaction time (in seconds) indicate that they are moderately fast when answering questions for 
the standard condition (M = 5.208; SD = 1.733), fastest in the low-uncertainty condition (M = 
5.063; SD = 1.823), and slowest in the high-uncertainty condition (M = 6.229; SD = 2.435).  
Inferential Statistics 
A repeated-measures (ANOVA) in SPSS revealed that there is a statistically significant 
effect of condition on reaction time, F(2,56) = 25.064, p < .0001, η2 = .309. Follow-up pairwise 
comparisons revealed that this is mainly driven by the longer response times in the high-
uncertainty condition, as it differed significantly from both the standard (M difference = 1.022; p < 
.0001) and low-uncertainty conditions (M difference = 1.166; p < .0001). However, the standard and 
low-uncertainty conditions did not differ significantly (M difference = 0.145; ns).  
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Appendix G: Sample Stimuli for the Standard Condition of Study 3 
  
 
  
 
 
Note. Stimuli were modified stories from the ToM-Battery (Hutchins et al., 2008). 
 
Where does Patty think her 
glasses are? Does Patty know 
where her glasses are? 
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Appendix H: Sample Stimuli for the Low-Uncertainty Condition of Study 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Stimuli were modified stories from the ToM-Battery (Hutchins et al., 2008). 
 
Where does Patty think her 
glasses are? Does Patty know 
where her glasses are? 
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Appendix I: Sample Stimuli for the High-Uncertainty Condition of Study 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Stimuli were modified stories from the ToM-Battery (Hutchins et al., 2008). 
Where does Patty think her 
glasses are? Does Patty know 
where her glasses are? 
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travel ban). An information-theoretic approach to theory of mind development: 
Uncertainty reduction helps 3-year-olds. Talk to be given at the Society for Research in 
Child Development (SRCD) Biennial Meeting, Austin, TX.  
Kamkar, N., & Cohen, A. S. (2016, May). Theory of mind or cognitive control? A critical  
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examination of mental state reasoning in preschool aged children. Poster presented at the 
36th annual meeting of the Southern Ontario Neuroscience Association (SONA), Waterloo, 
ON. 
Kamkar, N., & Morton, J. B. (2015, April). The timing of stress influences whether or not  
children learn more from rewards or losses. Poster presented to the Department of 
Psychology for the Honours Thesis Poster Presentation Day, Western University, London 
ON. 
 
Invited Talks            
Kamkar, N. (April 2017). Why Come to Graduate School? Graduate School and the Cohen  
Laboratory. Bring an Undergrad to Grad School. Western University, London ON. 
Hosseini-Kamkar, N., & Kamkar, N.  (November 2015). Memory, Self-Control, Prosopagnosia  
and Savants: An Overview of What Neuroscientists and Psychologists Can Study. 
Western Women in Neuroscience Outreach. Lord Dorchester Secondary School, 
Dorchester ON. 
Kamkar, N. (October 2015). Theory of Mind and Social Attention: An Overview of the Cohen  
Laboratory’s Current Research. The Rotman Institute of Philosophy. Western University, 
London ON. 
Kamkar, N. (October, 2015). What is Graduate School? An Overview of Graduate Studies in  
Psychology and Neuroscience. Western Women in Neuroscience Outreach. Saint Thomas 
Acquinas Catholic Secondary School, London ON. 
Kamkar, N. (September, 2015). Why Neuroscience is Interesting: Case Studies, Imaging Tools  
and Neuro-Myths. Western Women in Neuroscience Outreach. Saint André Bessette 
Catholic Secondary School, London ON. 
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Kamkar, N., El-Baba, M. (May, 2015). Why Neuroscience is Interesting: Case Studies, Imaging  
Tools and Neuro-Myths. Western Women in Neuroscience Outreach. Holy Cross 
Catholic Secondary School, Strathroy ON. 
Kamkar, N. (November, 2014). An Overview of my Honours Thesis: Investigating the  
Relationship between Environmental Stress and Reward Sensitivity. Western Women in 
Neuroscience Outreach. Holy Cross Catholic Secondary School, Strathroy ON. 
 
Teaching Experience           
Teaching Assistant         Winter 2017 
Introduction to Developmental Psychology (Psychology 2410A)  
Course Instructor: Dr. Lynne Zarbatany, Western University 
 Taught material for two tutorial classes on a weekly basis. 
 Graded written and oral presentations of a large research project. 
 
Teaching Assistant         Winter 2015 
Special Topics in Psychology (Psychology 3991G)  
Course Instructor: Dr. Adam S. Cohen, Western University 
 Participated in active weekly discussions for an upper-year seminar course. 
 Graded written work on the topic of evolutionary developmental psychology. 
 
Teaching Assistant         Fall 2015 
Introduction to Developmental Psychology (Psychology 2410A)  
Course Instructor: Dr. Adam S. Cohen, Western University 
 Taught material for two tutorial classes on a weekly basis. 
 Graded written and oral presentations of a large research project. 
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Certified Student         Summer 2015 
The Teaching Assistant Training Program (TATP) 
Western University 
 Successfully received certification of completion for TATP. 
 TATP is an interdisciplinary course offered through the Teaching Support Centre. 
 The program is intended for graduate teaching assistants and teaches various strategies and 
practices of University teaching. 
 
Supervising Experience           
Independent Study Student        Fall 2016 
Psychology 3996F 
Department of Developmental Psychology, Western University. 
Primary Supervisor: Dr. Adam S. Cohen 
 Created course syllabus. 
 Met regularly with student in order to develop an empirically motivated and feasible research 
project for course credit. 
 Graded all written work pertaining to the final project. 
 
Independent Study Student        Winter 2017 
Psychology 3997G 
Department of Developmental Psychology, Western University. 
Primary Supervisor: Dr. Adam S. Cohen 
 Created course syllabus. 
 Met regularly with student in order to develop an empirically motivated and feasible research 
project for course credit. 
 Graded all written work pertaining to the final project. 
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Volunteer Experience           
Developmental Brown Bag Organizer      2015-2016 
Department of Developmental Psychology, Western University. 
 Organized a series of weekly departmental talks by both graduate students and faculty in 
Developmental Psychology and Neuroscience. 
 
Undergraduate Journal Reviewer       2015-2016 
Western Undergraduate Psychology Journal (WUPJ), Western University. 
 Reviewed empirical papers, research proposals, and theoretical review papers submitted by 
undergraduate students.  
 
Secondary School Outreach Director      2015-present 
The Western Women in Neuroscience (Western WINS) Organization 
Co-Founders: Dr. Jessica Grahn., Niki Hosseini-Kamkar., Emily S. Nichols., & Ramina Adam. 
 Western University. 
 Organized a series of outreach talks to various secondary schools in the London and 
surrounding area with the purpose of engaging the interest of young scholars in the fields of 
Psychology and Neuroscience. 
 Corresponded with both secondary school staff members as well as a diverse sample of 
graduate students in Psychology and Neuroscience with the intent of conveying the implicit idea 
that researchers can be both male and female and can come from various demographic 
backgrounds. 
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Inspiring Young Women in STEM Conference Administrator    2015-2016 
The Western Women in Neuroscience (Western WINS) Organization 
Co-Founders: Dr. Jessica Grahn., Niki Hosseini-Kamkar., Emily S. Nichols., & Ramina Adam. 
Western University. 
 Organized speaker presentations from various faculty members including Dr. Christine Tenk 
and Dr. Anabel Quan-Haase at Western University for a conference aimed at inspiring young 
undergraduate women to pursue careers in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics 
(STEM). 
 Rated poster presentations of undergraduate students in various disciplines of Science and 
Engineering for receipt of a set of awards. 
 
Psychology and Neuroscience Outreach Event Organizer   2015-2016 
The Canadian Association for Girls in Science (CAGIS) 
Co-Founders: Dr. Evelyn Vingilis., Niki Hosseini-Kamkar., & Erin Shumlich. 
Western University. 
 Organized an outreach program aimed at engaging the interest of young pre-adolescent girls 
in Psychology and Neuroscience. 
 
Volunteer Speaker         2014-2015 
The Western Women in Neuroscience (Western WINS) Organization 
Co-Founders: Dr. Jessica Grahn., Niki Hosseini-Kamkar., Emily S. Nichols., & Ramina Adam. 
Western University. 
 Voluntarily gave several presentations on selected topics in Psychology and Neuroscience at 
various secondary schools. 
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Fundraising Committee Volunteer       2009-2012 
Students Rebuilding Health in Rwanda, Western University. 
 Assisted in the organization of various fundraising events aimed at improving health care 
facilities available in Rwanda.  
 
Research Experience           
Honours Student          2014-2015 
Dr. Bruce Morton's Developmental Cognitive Neuroimaging Laboratory 
Western University 
 Conducted an experiment aimed at understanding the relationship between stressful life 
events and reward learning profiles in young children with a critical focus on the timing of 
stressful experiences. 
 
Research Assistant          2012-2015 
Dr. Bruce Morton's Developmental Cognitive Neuroimaging Laboratory 
Western University 
 Preprocessed a set of neuroimaging data obtained using functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (fMRI) from healthy participants and participants with Multiple Sclerosis (MS) using 
Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM) software. 
 Recruited participants from a developmental population pool by providing prospective 
participants with detailed information pertaining to a developmental neuroimaging study of 
genetic and environmental influences on cognitive and behavioural self-regulation. 
 Ran child participants (aged 9-12) and their parents through a mock scanning procedure to 
ensure the child's comfort with fMRI and assisted in running participants through an fMRI 
scanning procedure at the Robarts Research Institute.  
 Transferred written questionnaire data onto Microsoft Excel and converted raw scores into 
statistically appropriate values for formal behavioural analyses in a longitudinal study for PhD 
candidate Heather Wilk 
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Research Assistant         2010-2013 
Dr. William Fisher's Social Psychology Laboratory, under the supervision of Dr. Kohut 
Western University 
 Compiled an online questionnaire using the Qualtrics database for a study in collaboration 
with Dr. Lorne Campbell 
 Provided appropriate statistical formulas for a post-doctoral study of Dr. Salisbury 
 Had the opportunity to format and review a now published research article in accordance 
with proper APA 6 standards.  
 Had exposure running participants in the laboratory in accordance with the Ethical guidelines 
(obtained informed consent, respected confidentiality, and debriefed each participant 
appropriately upon completion of the study) 
 Met regularly to enhance inter-rater reliability by extensively discussing and correcting any 
potential biases in coding 
 Independently completed qualitative analysis on responses from a large scale participant 
survey using Microsoft Excel 
 
Other Professional Experience         
Administrative Assistant,        2009-2010 
Department of Statistical and Actuarial Sciences 
Western University 
 Performed daily administrative tasks for graduate students at Western University 
 Assisted in the admissions process for globally aspiring MSc and PhD students 
 Prepared and administered examinations in the field of statistical and actuarial sciences 
 Scheduled appointments and assigned tasks to teaching assistants to ensure their coursework, 
research, and teaching priorities do not conflict 
 Reviewed computations of financial budgets allocated to the department through government 
grants 
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Strengths             
 Attended a senior level neuroimaging course with Dr. Peter Bandettini for neuroscientists at 
the 44th annual meeting of the International Neuropsychological Society (INS) in Boston, 
Massachusetts.  
 Capable of preprocessing and analyzing neuroimaging data obtained from fMRI studies 
using Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM) software. 
 Exceptional oral and written presentation skills (scored in the 99th percentile on the analytic 
writing portion of the Graduate Record Examination) 
 Superb arithmetic skills (earned a final grade of 87% in Methods of Matrix Algebra) 
 Computer coding experience using MATLAB (earned a final grade of 94% in a graduate 
course on scientific computing) 
 Experienced with various computer applications including MATLAB, SPM8, R, SPSS, 
OpenSesame, Psychopy, and Qualtrics. 
 Extremely familiar with 6th edition APA formatting 
 Excellent administrative skills including an 96 Word Per Minute (WPM) type rate 
 Thorough understanding of human social psychology (earned a final grade of 92% in Social 
Psychology) 
 Considerable familiarity with both ethical and procedural guidelines concerning laboratory 
work 
 Intrinsically motivated to perfect the task or project assigned 
 
 
 
 
